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I. INTRODUCTION
Defendants have long objected to the imposition of punitive damages
in mass tort litigation, contending that such damages sanction defendants
repeatedly for the same culpable conduct. Courts generally have rejected
these contentions. Courts have concluded, at least in part, that even if
multiple punitive damage awards in mass tort litigation sanction a
defendant for the same culpable conduct, no single award of punitive
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damages punishes a defendant for the entire scope of its misconduct.1 In
other words, no single award represents total harm damages.2 In so
doing, however, courts fail to examine closely the process by which
punitive damage decisionmakers are asked to determine punitive damage
awards.3
As Professor Schwartz noted in a commentary on punitive damages in
mass tort litigation almost ten years ago, “the jury often determines [the
amount of punitive damages] by assessing the wrongfulness of the
defendant’s overall conduct, including its capacity to cause many
injuries.”4 While almost all states purport to limit punitive damages to
the harm to the injured plaintiff before the court, most states allow
decisionmakers to increase a punitive damage award based on the
“reprehensibility” of the defendant’s conduct.5 This reprehensibility
factor has been used as an opportunity to present to the decisionmakers
evidence of conduct directed at parties not before the court and the harm
that conduct caused to the absent parties. Particularly, the reprehensibility
factor has been used to allow the decisionmakers to consider the total
number of victims from defendant’s tortious conduct in setting a
punitive award and to increase the amount of a punitive damage award
based solely on the number of victims. As such, the reprehensibility
factor has been used as a vehicle to invite the decisionmakers to punish
the defendant not just for the harm caused to the injured plaintiff before
the court but also for the harm caused to all victims of the defendant’s
tortious activity. In other words, reprehensibility evidence has been used
to allow the punitive damage decisionmakers to impose total harm
damages. Thus, contrary to the courts’ characterization, multiple punitive
damage awards do expose the defendant to the potential for repeated
sanctions for the same misconduct in mass tort litigation.

1. See, e.g., Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1384, 1389 (3rd Cir. 1993) (noting that
the punitive damage award was intended to represent punishment for the conduct
directed at the injured plaintiff before the court only).
2. Commentator Thomas Colby describes the practice of awarding, in a single
case to a single victim, punitive damages to punish the defendant “for the full scope of
societal harm caused by its entire course of wrongful conduct” as the practice of
awarding “‘total harm’ punitive damages.” Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple
Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs,
87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 587 (2003). I adopt his terminology in this Article.
3. Punitive damages usually are awarded in a three-step process. Initially, the
trier of fact (usually a jury) determines liability for and the amount of punitive damages.
The trial court and an appellate court then review the award, and either court may remit
the award if that court concludes that the award is excessive. I use the term “punitive
damage decisionmakers” to refer to the trier of fact and both reviewing courts.
4. Gary T. Schwartz, Mass Torts and Punitive Damages: A Comment, 39 VILL. L.
REV. 415, 430 (1994).
5. See infra note 16.
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As commentator Thomas Colby recognized, literature on punitive
damages only rarely has discussed this practice of awarding total harm
damages,6 and the practice has gone largely unaddressed by lower
courts. However, the practice raises potential questions about the
viability of multiple punitive damage awards in mass tort litigation.7 In
this Article, I will discuss how the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
State Farm v. Campbell8 reformed the reprehensibility analysis and how
this reformation may have the perhaps unintended consequence of
eliminating the practice of awarding total harm damages. In particular,
in an effort to limit the size of individual punitive damage awards,
Campbell limits the use of evidence of conduct directed at parties not
before the court. Campbell prohibits an increase in reprehensibility
based solely on the large number of other acts or the large volume of
harm from those acts. Rather, reprehensibility may be increased based
on the presence of other acts only if those other acts demonstrate the
defendant’s knowledge of the consequences of its acts directed at the
plaintiff, the deliberateness of the defendant’s conduct directed at the
plaintiff or the defendant’s bad faith in dealing with the plaintiff. In so
limiting the role of other act evidence, Campbell limits the potential for
total harm punitive damages in mass tort litigation. At the same time,
Campbell reforms reprehensibility into an analysis that better comports
6. See, e.g., Colby, supra note 2, at 662; Schwartz, supra note 4, at 430–31.
Instead, some commentators start from the assumption that multiple punitive damage
awards punish a defendant for the same culpable conduct, then propose reforms to limit
the impact of duplicative awards. See, e.g., David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages
Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 411 (1994). Other
commentators, like courts, maintain that each award punishes the defendant for a
separate transaction, and hence, different culpable conduct. However, also like courts,
these commentators do not consider the information given to decisionmakers to calculate
awards. See, e.g., Jerry J. Phillips, Multiple Punitive Damage Awards, 39 VILL. L. REV.
433, 443–44 (1994).
7. Commentators have noted that multiple sanctions for the same misconduct
raise potential constitutional concerns. See, e.g., Michael B. Kelly, Do Punitive
Damages Compensate Society?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1429, 1434 (2004) (outlining
several due process objections to awarding punitive damages based on injuries to absent
parties); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 430–31 (arguing that the inability to join all claims in
a single forum allows for “normatively inappropriate multiple punishments”); John
Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L.
REV. 139, 140 (1986) (“[U]nrestrained punitive liability for a single course of conduct
[is] arguably unconstitutional.”). Likewise, awarding total harm damages raises
questions about a single court’s jurisdiction to award total harm damages as well as
choice of law concerns.
8. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
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with the traditional retributivist principles of criminal punishment put
forth as a justification for considering reprehensibility in the first
instance.
II. THE DEBATE OVER MULTIPLE PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Objections to Multiple Punitive Damage Awards
Opponents of multiple punitive damage awards have objected on two
related grounds. First, opponents contend that multiple punitive damage
awards punish a defendant for the same conduct or course of conduct
and that punishing a defendant multiple times for the same course of
conduct is fundamentally unfair.9 For example, opponents would argue
that in cases such as BMW v. Gore,10 awarding punitive damages to
every person who purchased a repaired or repainted automobile would
punish BMW for the same culpable conduct—the corporate decision by
BMW to sell cars without disclosing repairs which amounted to less than
3% of the total value.
Second, opponents argue that due process places some limit on the
total amount of punitive damages a defendant can be forced to pay for a
single act or course of conduct. While any individual punitive damage
award or even a series of multiple awards would not exceed this
substantive limit, opponents reason that at some point the aggregate
value of multiple punitive damage awards exceeds this limit and results
in “overkill.”11 For example, in a recent asbestos case, Owens Corning
estimated that juries in twenty-eight cases filed across the country had
awarded more than $51 million in punitive damages to plaintiffs in
9. Glasscock v. Armstrong Cork Co., 946 F.2d 1085, 1096 (5th Cir. 1991)
(discussing an asbestos defendant’s argument that repeated punitive damage awards in
asbestos exposure cases rely on the same culpable conduct, thus punishing the same
wrongdoing, and that due process limited the number of times a corporation could be
made to pay sanctions for the same culpable act); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d
187, 215 (Colo. 1984) (noting an argument by a pharmaceutical manufacturer that the
potential for multiple punitive damage awards involving the same conduct offended
fundamental fairness); see also Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036,
1042 (5th Cir. 1984) (involving an asbestos manufacturer who argued that multiple penalties
violate double jeopardy).
10. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
11. See, e.g., Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1384, 1402 (3d Cir. 1993) (Weis, J.
dissenting); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1188 (8th Cir. 1982) (Heaney,
J. dissenting):
[T]here is surely some limit imposed by law on the amount for which
[defendants] can be held liable for a single wrongful act or course of conduct.
Unlimited multiple punishment for the same act determined in a succession of
individual lawsuits and bearing no relation to the defendants’ culpability or the
actual injuries suffered by victims, would violate the sense of “fundamental
fairness” that is essential to constitutional due process.
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lawsuits against Owens Corning arising out of the manufacturer and sale
of asbestos-containing insulation. Owens Corning argued that the cumulative
size of multiple punitive damage awards grossly exceeded the legitimate
ends of punishment and deterrence.12 Implicit in this argument is the
same assumption which underlies the first objection—that multiple
punitive damages repeatedly impose sanctions for the same misconduct.13
B. Judicial Responses
While courts have acknowledged concern over multiple punitive
damage awards, courts generally have rejected defendants’ challenges.
Many of these courts have concluded that even if multiple punitive
damage awards sanction a defendant for the same culpable conduct, no
single award sanctions the defendant for the entire scope of that
misconduct. Instead, these courts reason that each award punishes the
defendant for its conduct only to the extent that it harmed the injured
plaintiff before the court. Thus, for example, in cases such as Gore,14
these courts would conclude that awarding punitive damages to each
consumer who purchased a repainted car might punish BMW for the
same culpable conduct—the corporate decision to sell cars without
disclosing repairs which were made for less than 3% of the car’s retail
value—but that no single award to a purchaser would punish BMW for
the entire scope of the decision. Instead, each award would punish
BMW only to the extent that BMW’s corporate policy harmed the
injured plaintiff before the court. Consequently, these courts reason that
multiple awards are not duplicative.15
12. See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 39 (Tex.
1998). Owens-Corning conceded that it had paid only approximately $3 million in
punitive damage awards. Id.
13. See Simpson v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 901 F.2d 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1990)
(noting that both the overkill argument and the repetitive sanction argument rely on the
premise that the wrongful conduct sought to be punished in a subsequent suit is the same
conduct that was previously punished).
14. Gore, 517 U.S. at 559.
15. See, e.g., Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1384 (noting that because the district court expressly
referred to the amount of compensatory damages in calculating a remitted punitive
award, the remitted award was intended to represent punishment for conduct directed at
the plaintiff only); King v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 906 F.2d 1022, 1030 (5th Cir.
1990) (“On this record this Court cannot hold that Celotex has been punished repetitively
and so excessively ‘as to shock the sense of mankind’ in violation of the Texas
Constitution. Here the jury’s award of punitive damages was specifically targeted to
Celotex’s conduct as it affected each plaintiff.”); Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 718
F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (D.N.J. 1989), modifying 705 F. Supp. 1053 (D.N.J. 1989); Owens-
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III. VEHICLES FOR IMPOSING TOTAL HARM DAMAGES
A. Reprehensibility as a Vehicle for Imposing Total Harm Damages
As Professor Schwartz recognized, current procedures for awarding
punitive damages invite the punitive damage decisionmakers to consider
the entire scope of a defendant’s misconduct, including transactions with
other consumers and, consequently, the harm to those other consumers.
Most states instruct the trier of fact (usually the jury) to consider certain
factors in deciding initially whether to award punitive damages and in
what amount. Some of these factors invite the trier of fact and reviewing
courts to consider the entire scope of a defendant’s misconduct,
including conduct the defendant directed at parties other than the injured
party before the court. For example, some states require the trier of fact
to consider the “reprehensibility” of the defendant’s misconduct in
determining the size of any punitive award.16 These states, in turn,
Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Ky. 1998); Eagle-Picher
Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 604 A.2d 445, 472 (Md. 1992) (rejecting the defendants’ due
process challenge because the defendants failed to show that the factfinder, making a
previous award, understood its award to be punishment for the full extent of the
defendants’ misconduct rather than punishment for the injuries to the particular plaintiff
before that court); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 591 A.2d 544, 557–58 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1991) (holding that punitive damages were awarded solely for the harm inflicted
upon a specific plaintiff rather than for the totality of the harm), rev’d on other grounds,
604 A.2d 47 (Md. 1992).
16. At least thirteen states expressly instruct the trier of fact to consider the
reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct. See, e.g., Arizona: Hawkins v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1073, 1080 (Ariz. 1987) (“[A] category of relevant evidence [for the
fact finder to consider in determining a reasonable punitive damage award] is the nature
of the defendant’s conduct, including the reprehensibility of the conduct.”); California:
California Jury Instructions, Civil 14.71 (2004) (“In arriving at any award of punitive
damages, consider the following factors: (1) the reprehensibility of the conduct of the
defendant. . . .”); Illinois: Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 576 N.E.2d 1146, 1168 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991) (“The reprehensibility of . . . misconduct and the need to deter it are primary
factors in determining the appropriate level of punitive damages.”). Other states instruct
the trier of fact to consider similar factors like the nature of the defendant’s conduct.
See, e.g., Florida: Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases, PD–1 6 (2004)
(instructing the jury to consider “the nature, extent and degree of misconduct”);
Georgia: Hospital Auth. v. Jones, 386 S.E.2d 120, 124 n.13 (Ga. 1989) (stating that in
awarding punitive damages, the fact finder may consider “the nature and egregiousness
of the defendant’s conduct”), vacated, 499 U.S. 914 (1991), aff’d, 409 S.E.2d 501
(1991); Iowa: Iowa Civil Jury Instruction No. 210.1 (1987) (instructing the jury to
consider the character and the degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence, the
necessity of preventing similar wrong and “the nature of the defendant’s conduct,” or the
defendant’s culpability); see also Alabama: S. Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Turner, 586
So. 2d 854, 857 (Ala. 1991) (stating that to determine the appropriate measure of
punitive damages, the fact finder must consider the “culpability of the wrongdoer”);
Colorado: Leidholt v. District Court, 619 P.2d 768, 770 (Colo. 1980) (“[I]n determining
the amount which should be awarded as punitive damages, the severity of the
defendant’s wrong . . . must be considered to ensure that the award will punish the
defendant.”); Wisconsin: Fahrenberg v. Tengel, 291 N.W.2d 516, 527 (Wis. 1980)
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measure reprehensibility based on the entire scope of the defendant’s
misconduct, including transactions with other parties and the number of
actual or potential victims of the defendant’s misconduct. This allows
the jury to increase its assessment of reprehensibility, and, hence, the
amount of punitive damages, based on the existence of multiple
transactions and multiple victims.17 Other states delineate the scope of
the defendant’s misconduct or the duration of the misconduct as a factor
for the decisionmaker to consider in and of itself.18 The states then
define the scope of the misconduct as the number of actual or potential
victims. Thus, these states allow the decisionmaker to consider transactions
other than the transaction with the injured plaintiff before the court.19
(“Factors to be considered in determining the proper amount to be awarded as punitive
damages include: the grievousness of the defendant’s acts.”).
17. See, e.g., Fernandez v. N. Shore Orthopedic Surgery & Sports Med., 79 F.
Supp. 2d 197, 207–08 & n.15 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that the existence of repeated
instances of misconduct was an aggravating factor supporting increased reprehensibility
and that repeated misconduct included misconduct directed toward parties other than the
plaintiff); Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F. Supp. 1536, 1557–58. (S.D. Fla. 1992) (“In considering
the nature, extent, and enormity of the wrong and all of the surrounding circumstances,
courts have regularly considered acts other than the acts giving rise to the defendant’s
liability to the plaintiff on the issue of punitive damages.”) (applying Florida law);
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1148 (Utah 2001) (noting
that the defendant “repeatedly and deliberately deceived and cheated its customers”—for
over two decades it “systematically harassed and intimidated opposing claimants,
witnesses, and attorneys” and “engaged in a pattern of trickery and deceit, false
statements, and other acts of affirmative misconduct”—in finding that the defendant’s
conduct was “malicious, reprehensible, and wrong”) (internal quotations omitted), rev’d,
538 U.S. 408 (2003); Sturges v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 39 S.W.3d 608, 614 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1998) (holding that evidence of the defendant’s interference with prior contracts
was improperly excluded because such evidence demonstrated the character of the
defendant’s conduct and the degree of the defendant’s culpability), rev’d on other
grounds, 52 S.W.3d 711, 729 (Tex. 2001); see also Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 710 A.2d
267, 285–86 (Md. 1998) (stating that lack of evidence that the defendant engaged in
similar misconduct directed at other employees was a basis for reducing the punitive
damage award).
18. See, e.g., Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 9.17.020(c)(4) (Michie 2002) (stating that in
determining the amount of punitive damages, “the fact finder may consider . . . the
duration of the conduct and any intentional concealment of the conduct”); Kansas: KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(b)(4) (1994) (stating that in determining the amount of punitive
damages, “the court may consider . . . the duration of the misconduct and any intentional
concealment of it”); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15–5.12(b)(4) (West 2000)
(stating that in determining the amount of punitive damages, the trier of fact considers
“the duration of the misconduct and any concealment”).
19. See, e.g., O’Gilvie v. Int’l Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1447 (10th Cir. 1987)
(stating that the “number of consumers whose safety was potentially impacted by [the
defendant’s] conduct with respect to [the product at issue]” supported an increased
punitive damage award), aff’d, 519 U.S. 79 (1996); Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
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Consideration of such evidence may result in a trier of fact imposing
sanctions to punish and deter the entire scope of conduct. Indeed, in
some instances, plaintiff’s counsel has invited the trier of fact to impose
punitive damages to punish the entire scope of the defendant’s misconduct,
including the defendant’s transactions with people other than the injured
parties before the court.20
All states provide for some judicial review of the punitive damage
award.21 However, like the trier of fact, the trial court and appellate
court are instructed to consider the reprehensibility of the defendant’s
misconduct in reviewing a fact finder’s punitive award22 or the duration
Co., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1262–63 (D. Kan. 2002) (noting that RJR “acted intentionally to
mislead the public” and that but for its misconduct “[f]ewer Kansas residents, thus,
would have suffered” in finding that RJR’s conduct was “extremely reprehensible”).
20. See Colby, supra note 2, at 584–85 & nn.3–4 (citing instances in which
plaintiff’s counsel argued to the jury that a defendant should be punished for the entire
scope of its misconduct and instances in which jurors reported setting awards based on
the entire scope of a defendant’s misconduct); see also Margaret Meriwether Cordray,
The Limits of State Sovereignty and the Issue of Multiple Punitive Damages Awards, 78
OR. L. REV. 275, 313 (1999) (noting that the distinction between punishing a defendant
directly for other transactions and using evidence of other transactions to help evaluate
the defendant’s blameworthiness “is a fine one” and opining that juries may not be able
to understand and apply it); Rachel A. Van Cleave, “Death Is Different,” Is Money
Different? Criminal Punishments, Forfeitures, and Punitive Damages—Shifting Constitutional
Paradigms for Assessing Proportionality, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 217, 271 (2003)
(noting that “it is not exactly clear whether there is a real difference” between
considering conduct as a measure of reprehensibility and punishing that conduct).
21. The Supreme Court has indicated that due process requires judicial review of
punitive damage awards. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 434–35 (1994).
22. At least twenty states expressly delineate the reprehensibility of the defendant
as a factor to consider in reviewing the size of a jury award. See, e.g., California:
Stevens v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 525, 533 (Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that in determining whether the size of an award “substantially serves the public
interest in punishment and deterrence,” a reviewing court should consider “the
reprehensibility of the defendant’s misdeeds”); Oregon: Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc.,
17 P.3d 473, 484 (Or. 2001) (stating that in determining the monetary range that a
rational juror would be entitled to award, a reviewing court should consider “the degree
of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct”). Other states direct reviewing courts to
consider similar factors such as the culpability of the defendant. See, e.g., South
Carolina: Gamble v. Stevenson, 406 S.E.2d 350, 354–55 (S.C. 1991) (holding that in
reviewing the excessiveness of a punitive damage award, a court considers: “(1)
defendant’s degree of culpability; (2) duration of the conduct; . . . (4) the existence of
similar past conduct”); Nevada: Ace Truck & Equip. Rentals, Inc. v. Kahn, 746 P.2d
132, 137 (Nev. 1987) (stating that in determining whether a punitive damage award is
excessive, a court will consider the “culpability and blameworthiness of the tortfeasor”).
Some states direct reviewing courts to consider the nature or egregiousness of the
misconduct. See, e.g., New Mexico: Aken v. Plains Elec. Generation & Transmission
Coop., Inc., 49 P.3d 662, 669–72 (N.M. 2002) (directing reviewing courts to consider
“the enormity and nature of the wrong”); Oklahoma: Scribner v. Hillcrest Med. Ctr.,
866 P.2d 437, 443 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992) (“[C]onsideration of the reasonableness of [a
punitive damage] award [should be compared] in relation to . . . the nature and
egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct.”); see also Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 549.20 (West 2000) (“The court shall specifically review the punitive damages award

1472

JANUTIS.DOC

8/21/2019 11:51 AM

[VOL. 41: 1465, 2004]

Reforming Reprehensibility
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

or scope of the misconduct.23 Indeed, in BMW v. Gore, the Supreme
Court recognized reprehensibility as “the most important indicium of the
reasonableness of a punitive damages award.” 24 As a recent case illustrates,
reviewing courts, like juries, often consider the number of actual victims
of the defendants’ misconduct as a measure of reprehensibility. In
Boeken v. Philip Morris, a Los Angeles jury imposed a $3 billion
punitive damage award on Philip Morris in a case brought by a single
lifelong smoker.25 The plaintiff in Boeken alleged that Philip Morris had
misrepresented the dangers of smoking and that Philip Morris had sold a
defective product. Ultimately, the trial court remitted the punitive award.
However, even after remittitur, the court awarded the plaintiff $100
million in punitive damages.26 In explaining the substantial size of the
remitted award, the court noted that the conduct of Philip Morris was
“utterly reprehensible.”27 The court concluded that Philip Morris’s conduct
was reprehensible, in part, because Philip Morris engaged in “a
nationwide pattern of deceit involving millions of American consumers.”28
B. Other Vehicles for Imposing Total Harm Damages
Other factors guiding jury and reviewing court discretion also invite
in light of the [following] factors: . . . the seriousness of hazard to the public arising from
the defendant’s misconduct [and] the duration of the misconduct . . . .”).
23. See, e.g., Arizona: Hyatt Regency Phoenix Hotel Co. v. Winston & Strawn,
907 P.2d 506, 520 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]his court examines allegedly excessive
punitive damage awards applying [the following] criteria . . . the reprehensibility of the
defendant’s conduct, including the duration of the misconduct . . . .”); New Jersey:
Lockley v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 828 A.2d 869, 878–79 (N.J. 2003) (reviewing courts
consider the factors used by the trier of fact to determine the award, including the
duration of the misconduct).
24. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
25. Boeken v. Philip Morris Inc., No. BC 226593, 2001 WL 1894403, at *1 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Aug. 9, 2001).
26. Id. at *7.
27. Id. at *5.
28. Id. at *3. State Farm v. Campbell, 65 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2001), the case
reversed by the Supreme Court, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), provides another example. The
Utah Supreme Court used the number of victims nationwide as a basis to reinstate a jury
punitive damage verdict after a lower court had remitted the verdict. See id. at 1148
(noting that “State Farm repeatedly and deliberately deceived and cheated its customers
via the PP & R scheme”); id. at 1150 (“Because State Farm’s actions have such
potentially widespread effects, this factor supports a high punitive damage award.”); id.
at 1151 (noting that State Farm’s willful and fraudulent conduct to Campbell and other
similarly situated Utah residents supported a larger ration of punitive damages to
compensatory damages).
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punitive damage decisionmakers to determine the amount of punitive
damages with reference to the entire scope of a defendant’s misconduct
and, hence, to punish the entire scope of the misconduct. For example,
many states instruct decisionmakers to consider the profitability of the
defendant’s conduct.29 These states frequently allow the decisionmaker
to consider the profit the defendant earned on the entire scope of the
misconduct30 or the defendant’s total financial condition.31 Such guidance
29. At least fifteen states direct the trier of fact to consider profitability. See, e.g.,
Arizona: Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1073, 1080 (Ariz. 1987) (stating that the
fact finder may consider several factors, including “the profitability of the defendant’s
conduct”); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(b)(3) (1994) (“[T]he court may
consider: . . . the profitability of the defendant’s misconduct.”); North Dakota: N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(5)(c)(2) (1996):
[T]he finder of fact shall find by clear and convincing evidence that the
amount of exemplary damages awarded is consistent with the following
principles and factors:
....
. . . The profitability to the defendant of the wrongful conduct and the
desirability of removing that profit and of having the defendant also sustain a
loss . . . .
At least five states direct a reviewing court to consider the profitability of the
defendant’s misconduct. See, e.g., Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20 (West 2000)
(“The court shall specifically review the punitive damages award in light of the
[following] factors: . . . the profitability of the misconduct to the defendant . . . .”);
Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7)(c) (2003) (“The judge shall review a jury
award of punitive damages, giving consideration to each of the [following] matters: . . .
the profitability of the defendant’s wrongdoing . . . . ”); Tennessee: Hodges v. S.C. Toof
& Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901–02 (Tenn. 1992):
After a jury has made an award of punitive damages, the trial judge shall
review the award, giving consideration to all matters on which the jury is
required to be instructed [including] . . . [w]hether defendant profited from the
activity, and if the defendant did profit, whether the punitive award should be
in excess of the profit in order to deter similar future behavior.
Several other states direct a reviewing court to consider the defendant’s “financial
condition” or “wealth.” See, e.g., Arkansas: Advocat, Inc. v. Sauer, 111 S.W.3d 346,
358 (Ark. 2003) (stating that when reviewing a punitive damage award, a court should
consider “the financial and social condition and standing of the erring party”), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 535 (2003); Illinois: Hazelwood v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 450 N.E.2d
1199, 1207 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that factors that the reviewing court should
consider include “the financial status of the defendant”); Pennsylvania: Sprague v.
Walter, 656 A.2d 890, 927 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (stating that in reviewing a punitive
damage award, the trial court shall consider “the wealth of the defendant”).
30. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Johnston, 592 So. 2d 1054, 1061–62 (Ala.
1992) (noting that GM sold approximately 600,000 vehicles and sustaining the punitive
damage award against GM, in part, because even after paying the $15 million award, the
profit GM made on the total sales of the vehicle at issue would be greater than the profit
GM would have made had it replaced the allegedly defective part).
31. Several states instruct the trier of fact to consider the defendant’s “financial
condition” or “net wealth.” See, e.g., California: California Jury Instructions, supra
note 16, at 14.71 (“In arriving at any award of punitive damages, consider the following
factors: . . . the amount of punitive damages which will have a deterrent effect on the
defendant in the [sic] light of the defendant’s financial condition.”); Florida: Florida
Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases, PD–1 6 (2004) (instructing the jury to consider
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again invites the decisionmaker to disgorge profits earned from the
entire scope of the misconduct.
Many states insist that punitive damages bear a reasonable relationship
to the actual and potential harm caused by the defendant’s misconduct.32
the defendant’s “financial resources”); Indiana: Stroud v. Lints, 790 N.E.2d 440, 445
(Ind. 2003) (“[I]f punitive damages are appropriate, the wealth of the defendant has for
many years been held relevant to a determination of the appropriate amount.”).
Several other states direct a reviewing court to consider the defendant’s “financial
condition” or “wealth.” See, e.g., Arkansas: Sauer, 111 S.W.3d at 358 (stating that
when reviewing a punitive damage award, a court should consider “the financial and
social condition and standing of the erring party”); Illinois: Hazelwood, 450 N.E.2d at
1207 (holding that factors that the reviewing court should consider include “the financial
status of the defendant”); Pennsylvania: Sprague, 656 A.2d at 927 (stating that in
reviewing a punitive damage award, the trial court shall consider “the wealth of the
defendant”).
See also, e.g., Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 510, 534 (Ct. App. 1998)
(sustaining a $3.5 million punitive damage award, in part, because it was only five
percent of the defendant’s total net worth); Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 925 P.2d 107,
121 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (sustaining $4 million punitive damage award, in part, because
it was only five percent of the defendant’s total net value), aff’d, 987 P.2d 463 (Or.
1999); see also Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1147 (vacating trial court remittitur and re-instating
$145 million punitive damage award, noting that the award was 0.26 of one percent of
the defendant’s total net worth and that the defendant’s large financial worth merited a
larger award); Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1259–60 (D.
Kan. 2002) (holding “[t]he profitability that this court must consider is the gain realized
by Reynolds from the course of conduct giving rise to plaintiff’s injuries” and measuring
RJR’s profits based on sales of cigarettes to the entire public); Williams v. Philip Morris
Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 839–40 (Ore. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that defendant’s misconduct was
“highly profitable” based on evidence of defendant’s total net worth and its profits from
all cigarette sales in 1996 and 1997).
32. At least six states expressly instruct the trier of fact to consider the relationship
between the harm caused by the defendant and the amount of punitive damages. Four of
these states expressly instruct the trier of fact to consider both actual and potential harm.
See, e.g., New York: N.Y. Pattern Jury Instructions—Civil 2:278 (West, WESTLAW
through NY PJI (updated Dec. 2003)):
In arriving at your decision as to the amount of punitive damages you should
consider the following factors: . . . 2. The actual and potential harm created by
defendant’s conduct. The amount of punitive damages that you award must be
both reasonable and proportionate to the actual and potential harm suffered by
the plaintiff, and to the compensatory damages you awarded the plaintiff.
Virginia: Wilkins v. Peninsula Motor Cars, Inc., 59 Va. Cir. 329, 338 (2002) (“[F]actors
which are relevant to determining an appropriate measure of punitive damages: (a)
whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award and the
harm likely to result from the defendant’s conduct as well as the harm that has actually
occurred . . . .”).
Fourteen additional states direct reviewing courts to consider the relationship between
harm and punitive damages. Eight of these states expressly direct reviewing courts to
consider potential as well as actual harm. See, e.g., Louisiana: In re New Orleans Train
Car Leakage Fire Litig., 795 So. 2d 364, 386 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (“We also assess the
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Others instruct the decisionmaker to consider factors such as the
“magnitude of the harm,”33 “the extent and enormity of the harm,” or the
“severity of the harm.”34 Factors such as these ostensibly serve as
limiting factors, requiring the decisionmaker to set a punitive damage
award with reference only to the transaction between the plaintiff before
the court and the defendant. Indeed, some courts have rejected defendants’
due process challenges on the grounds that these factors demonstrated
that a punitive damage award did not punish a defendant for the entire
scope of its misconduct but for only that misconduct directed at the
plaintiff before the court.35 However, in practice these factors sometimes
provide another opportunity for the punitive damage decisionmaker to
set the damage award in reference to the total harm caused by the
defendant’s misconduct. Some states measure that harm not only as the
harm to the injured party before the court, but also the harm to others.36
Like using transactions with third parties as a measure of reprehensibility,
such considerations also invite the punitive damage decisionmaker to
impose sanctions on the entire scope of the defendant’s misconduct.
quantum of punitive damages relative to, not only the actual harm that occurred, but also
relative to the potential harm that could have occurred . . . .”), cert. denied, Nova Chems.
Inc. v. Adams, 538 U.S. 944 (2003); Massachusetts: Labonte v. Hutchins & Wheeler,
678 N.E.2d 853, 862 (Mass. 1997) (“In reviewing punitive damages, the judge may
consider the following criteria: a reasonable relationship to the harm that is likely to
occur from the defendant’s conduct as well as to the harm that actually has
occurred . . . .”); Washington: State v. WWJ Corp., 980 P.2d 1257, 1263 (Wash. 1999)
(following factor test of BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580–83 (1996), in
which the Court compared the amount of the punitive award with the actual and potential
harm caused by the defendant).
33. See, e.g., Alaska: Alaskan Vill., Inc. v. Smalley, 720 P.2d 945, 949 (Alaska 1986).
34. See Colorado: Leidholt v. District Court, 619 P.2d 768, 770 (Colo. 1980).
35. See Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1054 (D.N.J. 1989),
modified on reconsideration, 718 F. Supp. 1233 (D.N.J. 1989). In Juzwin, the court
conditionally struck an award of punitive damages, concluding that subjecting defendants
to multiple punitive damage awards would deprive defendants of their right to
fundamentally fair proceedings. Id. at 1064. On reconsideration, however, the court
vacated its order striking punitive damage claims before it upon competent proof of
previous awards. Juzwin, 718 F. Supp. at 1236. The court reiterated its holding that
repetitive punitive damage awards violate due process. Id. at 1234. However, the court
reasoned that multiple awards are not necessarily repetitive. Id. at 1235. In reaching this
determination, the court noted, in part, that many states require courts to instruct juries
that the amount of a punitive damage award must bear a reasonable relationship to
compensatory damages. Id. The court reasoned that a jury rendering an award after
such an instruction might not consider the full effect of the defendant’s conduct with
respect to injured people other than the plaintiff. Id. Thus, the court concluded that a
second award of punitive damages would not violate the due process clause if the first
award was not intended by the jury to constitute “full” punishment for the defendant’s
wrongful conduct. Id.
36. See, e.g., Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 841 (Or. Ct. App. 2002)
(noting in its discussion of ratio that “[i]t is thus appropriate to consider the effects of
defendant’s actions on persons other than [the plaintiff] in determining the amount of
punitive damages”), vacated, 124 S. Ct. 56 (2003), aff’d, 92 P.3d 126 (2004).
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IV. REFORMING REPREHENSIBILITY IN CAMPBELL
As it had done in BMW v. Gore,37 the Court in Campbell sought to
impose substantive limits on the size of individual punitive awards.38
Although not addressing the propriety of total harm damages directly,
Campbell attacked the reprehensibility factor as a method of reducing
the size of individual awards. In so doing, Campbell reformed the
reprehensibility analysis. Campbell prohibits the use of evidence of acts
directed at parties other than the injured party before the court as a direct
measure of reprehensibility.39 Instead, Campbell limits consideration of
other act evidence to use solely as a measure of the defendant’s knowledge
with respect to the transaction between the defendant and the plaintiff
before the court. This, in turn, limits the potential for total harm damages.
In State Farm v. Campbell,40 the Court struck down a state court
punitive damages award, concluding that it was grossly excessive under
the guideposts the Court previously had announced in BMW v. Gore.
Campbell, a State Farm insured, had been involved in a three-car auto
accident in which the driver of one car was killed and the driver of
another was seriously injured. The estate of the deceased driver and the
injured driver sued Campbell and offered to settle for an amount equal to
the policy limits of the State Farm insurance policy covering Campbell.
Even though the evidence strongly indicated that Campbell was at fault,
State Farm refused to accept the settlement.41 State Farm also assured
Campbell that he was likely to prevail at trial, that his personal assets
were safe, and that he need not retain counsel.42 At trial, however, a jury
awarded the two plaintiffs damages well in excess of the policy limits.43
State Farm initially refused to pay the excess and informed Campbell
that he would be personally liable for the judgment. However, after
Campbell’s appeal was denied, State Farm paid the entire judgment,
including the amounts in excess of the policy limits.44
37. Gore, 517 U.S. at 559.
38. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
39. Id. at 410 (“Due process does not permit courts to adjudicate the merits of other
parties’ hypothetical claims under the guise of the reprehensibility analysis. Punishment
on these bases creates the possibility of multiple punitive damages awards for the same
conduct, for nonparties are not normally bound by another plaintiff’s judgment.”).
40. Id. at 429.
41. See id. at 412–14.
42. Id. at 413.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 413–14.
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Campbell and his wife instituted a claim against State Farm, alleging
bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. At trial
on the bad faith claim, a Utah jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million
in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages.45 The
trial court reduced the awards to $1 million and $25 million respectively.46
However, the Utah Supreme Court reinstated the $145 million punitive
damage award.47 State Farm appealed to the United States Supreme
Court contending that the punitive damage award was constitutionally
excessive under BMW v. Gore.
The United States Supreme Court found the $145 million punitive
award unconstitutionally excessive. The Court reasoned that the punitive
damage award impermissibly attempted to punish State Farm for its
nationwide claims adjustment policies. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court reiterated its holding in BMW v. Gore that a state may not impose
punitive damages to punish extraterritorial conduct which was lawful
where it occurred.48 The Court also expanded this holding, concluding
that a state does not have a legitimate interest in imposing punitive
damages to punish a defendant for extraterritorial conduct that was
unlawful where it occurred.49 The Court noted that the Campbells introduced
evidence regarding State Farm’s nationwide claims adjustment policy,
including expert testimony regarding fraudulent practices under the
policy and evidence concerning State Farm’s handling of first-party and
non-auto insurance claims over the course of twenty years.50 Likewise,
the Court noted that counsel for the Campbells argued that State Farm’s
conduct toward the Campbells was part of a nationwide scheme to
fraudulently keep claim pay outs low and increase profits.51 Finally, the
Court noted that both the trial court and the Utah Supreme Court relied
on State Farm’s nationwide policies in upholding the punitive damage
award.52 Based on the lower courts’ opinions, the Court concluded that
State Farm was being punished for this conduct in addition to its conduct
directed toward the Campbells.
The Campbells argued that the evidence of State Farm’s claimhandling policies was relevant not as a basis for punitive damages
themselves but, instead, as indicia of the degree of reprehensibility in
State Farm’s dealings with the Campbells. The Campbells argued that
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
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the evidence demonstrated State Farm’s motive in its treatment of them.
The Campbells reasoned that tactics designed to underpay first-party
claimants to increase State Farm’s profits were relevant to demonstrate
that State Farm engaged in tactics designed to underpay third-party
claimants for the same purpose—to increase profits.53 The Court
rejected this role for extraterritorial conduct. The Court noted, as it had
in Gore, that extraterritorial conduct can be relevant to demonstrate
deliberateness and culpability.54 However, the Court concluded that
extraterritorial conduct must have a “nexus to the specific harm suffered
by the plaintiff” to be relevant to deliberateness and culpability.55
Further, the Court held that a jury had to be specifically instructed
that it could not use punitive damages to punish lawful extraterritorial
conduct.56 Here, the Court reasoned that evidence of State Farm’s
nationwide claims adjustment policies was not related to its handling
of third-party claims like the claims at issue in Campbell and, thus,
not relevant to an assessment of State Farm’s reprehensibility.57
Stripped of evidence of extraterritorial misconduct, the Court concluded
that State Farm’s conduct toward the Campbells was not sufficiently
reprehensible to warrant such a large punitive award.58
Campbell is significant to reprehensibility analysis and to the
viability of multiple punitive damage awards for three reasons. First,
in Campbell, the Court recognized for the first time that other
misconduct evidence introduced ostensibly to demonstrate reprehensibility
may be used to sanction the defendant directly for that other misconduct.
As stated above, the Campbells introduced evidence regarding State
Farm’s nationwide claims adjustment policy, including evidence
concerning State Farm’s handling of first-party and non-auto insurance
claims by other insureds.59 The Campbells contended that such
evidence was relevant to establish the degree of reprehensibility of
State Farm’s conduct directed at the Campbells. However, the Court
rejected the Campbells’ characterization, concluding that the Utah
courts had used this measure of reprehensibility as a “guise” to punish

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 421–24.
Id. at 422.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 423–24.
Id. at 419–20.
See id. at 414–15.
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State Farm for its actions toward individuals other than the Campbells.60
Second, in Campbell, the Court appears to have prohibited the use of
evidence of the number of transactions with other parties as a direct
measure of reprehensibility and, hence the use of reprehensibility to
award total harm damages. The Campbell Court expressly prohibited the
use of evidence of unrelated transactions as a measure of reprehensibility.
Further, the Court prohibited the use of unrelated transactions precisely
because the Court concluded that unrelated transaction evidence was
used as a means to impose punitive damages directly for that unrelated
misconduct. To this end, the Court held: “For a more fundamental reason,
however, the Utah courts erred in relying upon [evidence of transactions
with other parties]: The courts awarded punitive damages to punish and
deter conduct that bore no relation to the Campbells’ harm.”61 Likewise,
in explaining why State Farm’s conduct was insufficiently reprehensible
to warrant the severe sanction imposed by the Utah courts, the Court
noted: “The Campbells have identified scant evidence of repeated
misconduct of the sort that injured them. Nor does our review of the
Utah courts’ decisions convince us that State Farm was only punished
for its actions toward the Campbells.”62
More importantly, this rationale would seem to prohibit the use of
related misconduct as a direct measure of reprehensibility as well. Some
language in Campbell ostensibly leaves open the possibility of using
evidence of related misconduct as a measure of reprehensibility. For
example, the Court acknowledge that “[l]awful out-of-state conduct may
be probative” if it bears a “nexus to the specific harm suffered by the
plaintiff.”63 Likewise, as noted above, in explaining why State Farm’s
conduct was insufficiently reprehensible to warrant the severe sanction
the Court noted not only that the Utah courts had punished State Farm
for conduct directed at other parties but also that “[t]he Campbells have
identified scant evidence of repeated misconduct of the sort that injured
them.”64 Finally, in explaining why the transaction between the
Campbells and State Farm was the only conduct relevant to the
60. Id. at 422–23. At oral argument one of the Justices remarked:
If you’ve done the same thing to other people, you can be punished more.
Now, you may find a significant difference between punishing you for what
you did to other people, and punishing you more for what you did to this
person, because it is rendered more reprehensible because of what you did to
other people, but I don’t see a whole lot of difference between the two.
Oral argument transcript at 15, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S.
408 (2003) (No. 01-1289) (Dec. 11, 2002).
61. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 422.
62. Id. at 423.
63. Id. at 422.
64. Id. at 423.
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reprehensibility analysis, the Court noted, “because the Campbells have
shown no conduct by State Farm similar to that which harmed them, the
conduct that harmed them is the only conduct relevant to the reprehensibility
analysis.”65 This language suggests that if the Campbells had offered evidence
of State Farm misconduct in transactions with similarly situated third
parties, such as evidence of misconduct by State Farm in its handling of
third-party auto insurance claims, the Court would have considered these
third-party transactions to be relevant measures of State Farm’s reprehensibility.
If this is so, Campbell would do little to prevent the use of
reprehensibility to award total harm damages in mass tort litigation. The
other misconduct evidence offered as a measure of reprehensibility in
such actions is likely to be related to the misconduct directed at the
injured plaintiff before the court. For example, in Boeken the California trial
court found Philip Morris’s conduct to be “utterly reprehensible” because
“millions of American consumers” relied on the same misrepresentations
that injured plaintiff before the court.66 Conduct directed at these absent
consumers would seem to be related to the conduct that injured the
plaintiff before the court in Boeken under any definition of relatedness
because the exact same conduct was directed at the absent parties and the
party before the court.67 Thus, courts could continue to use reprehensibility
as a basis to sustain total harm damages.
65. Id. at 424.
66. Boeken v. Philip Morris Inc., No. BC 226593, 2001 WL 1894403, at*3, *5
(Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 9, 2001); see supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.
67. Several courts have reached this conclusion post-Campbell. See, e.g., Henley
v. Philip Morris Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 71–72 (Ct. App. 2004):
Defendant also substantially overstates this aspect of Campbell by suggesting
that it rendered such evidence [of out-of-state conduct] categorically
inadmissible. On the contrary, the court acknowledged that such evidence may
be considered if a sufficient ‘nexus’ is shown to the plaintiff’s claim. . . .
Plaintiff’s claims, in contrast [to those in Campbell], rest on a quintessential
‘mass tort,’ i.e., a course of more-or-less uniform conduct directed at the entire
public and maliciously injuring, through a system of interconnected devices, an
entire category of persons to which plaintiff squarely belongs.
See also Bocci v. Key Pharms., Inc., 76 P.3d 669, 674 (Or. Ct. App. 2003), modified on
reconsideration, 76 P.3d 908 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (correcting punitive damages ratio):
[The Campbell Court] did not say that out-of-state conduct [evidence] is per se
irrelevant. To the contrary, it stated that “evidence of repeated misconduct of
the sort that injured” the plaintiff is entirely relevant. In this case, there was
evidence that [the defendant] engaged in nationwide misconduct in
disseminating false and misleading information to the FDA and to physicians
about [its product] and that the dissemination of that misleading information
led to [plaintiffs’] damages.
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However, a closer examination of Campbell reveals that the underlying
premise would prohibit the use of both related and unrelated misconduct
as measures of reprehensibility in and of themselves. In rejecting the
Utah courts’ reliance on evidence of unrelated transactions, the Court
explained that the problem with the use of such evidence was that it was
used as a vehicle to impose sanctions directly on those unrelated
transactions. The Court explained that due process prohibited a court from
adjudicating and punishing hypothetical claims under the guise of
reprehensibility.68 The Court continued: “Punishment on these bases creates
the possibility of multiple punitive damages awards for the same
conduct; for in the usual case nonparties are not bound by the judgment
some other plaintiff obtains.”69
Likewise, in rejecting a state’s ability to sanction unlawful extraterritorial
conduct, the Campbell Court explained: “Any proper adjudication of
conduct that occurred outside Utah to other persons would require their
inclusion, and, to those parties, the Utah courts, in the usual case, would
need to apply the laws of their relevant jurisdiction.”70 This suggests
that the Court’s concern with the use of unrelated misconduct evidence
is not solely a concern with the extraterritorial nature of such evidence
and, hence, its potential interference with state sovereignty71 or a
concern that such evidence allows the defendant to be punished for its
status as an “unsavory individual or business” 72 rather than for the
defendant’s bad acts themselves. Instead, this suggests that the Court’s
concern is that the use of unrelated misconduct evidence as a measure of
reprehensibility may result in the defendant being punished for these
unrelated acts directly and, hence, subject the defendant to the risk that it
will be punished for these same acts again in a lawsuit brought by the
victims of the unrelated acts.73
68. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 423.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 421–22 (emphasis added).
71. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996) (“We think it
follows from these principles of state sovereignty and comity that a State may not
impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing the
tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in other States.”); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 421.
72. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 423.
73. But see Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113
YALE L.J. 347, 350 (2003). Professor Sharkey argues that a “more contextualized and
nuanced reading of [Campbell], however, suggests that the Court was primarily
concerned with limiting the extraterritorial or out-of-state reach of punitive damages.”
However, had the Court been concerned primarily with the extraterritorial reach of
punitive damages, it would have had no need to raise its due process objection to the
potential for multiple damages. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 423. The Court had already
held that states could not impose punitive damages to punish lawful or unlawful
extraterritorial conduct, id. at 421, and concluded that the Utah courts had impermissibly
attempted to punish State Farm for its extraterritorial claims handling practices. See id.
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Use of evidence of related misconduct as much as use of unrelated
misconduct would invite the jury to “adjudicate the merits of other
parties’ hypothetical claims.”74 Thus, use of related misconduct evidence as
a direct measure of reprehensibility would seem to expose the defendant
to the same risk of multiple punitive damage awards which the Campbell
Court sought to eliminate. Indeed, the use of related misconduct as a
direct measure of reprehensibility seems to have resulted in potentially
duplicative awards in mass tort litigation.75
Moreover, the Campbell Court’s overriding concern seemed to be not
just that State Farm was punished for misconduct unrelated to the
misconduct directed at the Campbells, but more generally that State
Farm was punished for any conduct other than the conduct directed at
the Campbells. On several occasions in the opinion the Court noted its
concern that the other misconduct evidence had resulted in sanctions
imposed directly on that misconduct. For example, in striking down the
punitive award, the Court noted: “This case, instead, was used as a
platform to expose, and punish, the perceived deficiencies of State
Farm’s operations throughout the country. The Utah Supreme Court’s opinion
makes explicit that State Farm was being condemned for its nationwide
policies rather than for the conduct directed toward the Campbells.”76
Likewise, in assessing the reprehensibility of the award, the Court
observed: “Nor does our review of the Utah courts’ decisions convince
us that State Farm was only punished for its actions toward the
Campbells.”77
Even the Campbell Court’s discussion of the role of related misconduct
suggests that the Court viewed a limited role for such evidence. The
Court seemed to reject the existence of related misconduct by itself as a
measure of reprehensibility. Instead, the Campbell Court seemed to
suggest that related conduct directed at parties other than the plaintiff
before the court is relevant only to assess the knowledge, intent, or
deliberateness of the defendant with respect to its conduct toward the
at 422. Nonetheless, the Court continued its analysis, concluding that the Utah courts
erred “[f]or a more fundamental reason.” Id. at 422. That reason being that the Utah
courts imposed punitive damages to punish and deter conduct directed at parties other
than the Campbells and that such a use of punitive damages created a risk of multiple
punitive damage awards for the same conduct. See id. at 422–23.
74. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 422–23.
75. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
76. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 420.
77. Id. at 423.

1483

JANUTIS.DOC

8/21/2019 11:51 AM

particular plaintiff before the court. Indeed, the Court so stated: “Lawful
out-of-state conduct may be probative when it demonstrates the
deliberateness and culpability of the defendant’s action in the State
where it is tortious, but that conduct must have a nexus to the specific
harm suffered by the plaintiff.”78 Thus, Campbell appears to foreclose the
use of related misconduct as a direct measure of reprehensibility.79
At least one lower court has adopted this reading of Campbell. In
Wohlwend v. Edwards,80 the Indiana Court of Appeals concluded that a
plaintiff who was injured by a drunk driver could not admit evidence of
the defendant’s driving while intoxicated on subsequent occasions. The
Wohlwend court recognized that the Campbell Court spoke of “dissimilar”
acts.81 Likewise, the Wohlwend court acknowledged that the Campbell
Court expressly recognized that repeated actions increased the
reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct.82 The Wohlwend court noted
that the defendant’s subsequent drunk driving convictions were similar
to the conduct directed at the plaintiff before the court. However, the
court concluded that evidence of the subsequent convictions were not
relevant to establish reprehensibility under Campbell because a jury
might use this evidence to punish the defendant for the subsequent
convictions directly, and as such, use of the evidence would subject the
defendant to the risk of multiple punishment for the subsequent
incidents.83 Further, in support of its reasoning, the court relied on cases
78. Id. at 422 (emphasis added). The nexus requirement is consistent with the
requirement in tort law that prior incidents must be sufficiently similar to prove
knowledge of defect.
79. Such a reading is consistent with the Court’s discussion of related misconduct
in BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore. The Court’s assessment of BMW’s reprehensibility in
that case suggests that the Gore Court also viewed related misconduct as an indicium of
the defendant’s culpability with respect to the conduct directed at the injured plaintiff
before the court only. In Gore, as in Campbell, the plaintiff argued that evidence of
BMW’s failure to disclose minor repairs to other customers pursuant to the same
nondisclosure policy at issue in Gore was relevant to establish reprehensibility. BMW of
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576 (1996). The Court recognized that a defendant
who “has repeatedly engaged in prohibited conduct while knowing or suspecting that it
was unlawful” could be subject to greater sanctions on the basis of their increased
reprehensibility. Id. However, the Court concluded that evidence of these other
transactions were not relevant to establish BMW’s increased reprehensibility. Id. In so
doing, the Court noted that BMW reasonably could have believed that state disclosure
statutes created a safe harbor and, thus, that its policy was lawful in other states. Id. at
577–79. Likewise, the Court noted that BMW had not acted pursuant to its
nondisclosure policy once the policy had been adjudged unlawful. Id. In this way, the
Court’s reasoning focused solely on BMW’s knowledge at the time it engaged in the
conduct. This suggests that it is the defendant’s knowledge rather than the scope of its
conduct that determines reprehensibility.
80. Wohlwend v. Edwards, 796 N.E.2d 781, 787 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 786.
83. Id. at 787; see also id. at 789 (“In the present case, not only was there a
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precluding evidence of subsequent similar conduct because such conduct
could not establish the defendant’s state of mind at the time it committed
the conduct directed at the plaintiff.84 Thus, the Wohlwend court implicitly
recognized the limited role for related misconduct in establishing
reprehensibility.
Finally, the rationale underlying Campbell would appear to preclude
use of transactions with absent parties as a measure of the other factors
determining the size of punitive damages awards and, hence, preclude
the use of other factors to impose total harm damages. As discussed above,
many states instruct the punitive damages decisionmakers to consider
the profitability of the entire scope of the defendant’s misconduct in
setting an award.85 Likewise, while insisting that punitive damages bear
a reasonable relationship to the actual and potential harm caused by the
defendant’s misconduct, some states measure that harm not only as the
harm to the injured party before the court, but also the harm to others.86
While Campbell does not directly address the propriety of inviting the
jury to consider total profitability or total harm, the reasoning behind this
decision again suggests that the Court would limit consideration of
profitability to the profitability of the individual transaction between the
defendant and the injured parties before the court. Likewise, Campbell
suggests that the Court would prohibit consideration of harm caused by
transactions other than the transaction between the defendant and the
injured parties before the court.
As discussed above, Campbell recognized that although evidence of
transactions with parties other than the injured parties before the court is
put before punitive damage decisionmakers as a measure of reprehensibility,
decisionmakers may use such evidence to punish the defendant for those
other transactions directly. When put before punitive damage decisionmakers
as a measure of harm in relation to punitive damages, decisionmakers
seem just as likely to use evidence of transactions with parties other than
possibility that the jury based its award of punitive damages upon conduct other that than
[sic] which damaged the plaintiff, it was a near certainty. The jury was encouraged to do
just that.”).
84. See id. at 787–88.
85. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Williams v. Philip
Morris Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 841 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (noting in its discussion of ratio that
“[i]t is thus appropriate to consider the effects of defendant’s actions on persons other
than [the plaintiff] in determining the amount of punitive damages”), vacated, 124 S. Ct.
56 (2003), aff’d, 92 P.3d 126 (2004).
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those before the court to punish the defendant for those transactions
directly. Likewise, inviting punitive damage decisionmakers to consider
the profitability of an entire course of conduct invites decisionmakers to
disgorge profits from the entire course of conduct. Indeed, some courts
have done so.87 However, such disgorgement is tantamount to a sanction
imposed on the entire misconduct.
In Campbell, the Court prohibited use of transactions with others as a
measure of reprehensibility specifically because decisionmakers might
punish the defendant for those transactions directly; consequently, the
defendant would be subject to the risk of duplicative punishment for
those other transactions in subsequent actions brought by those absent
parties who were injured in the other transactions. Because punitive
damages decisionmakers may use evidence of other transactions offered
as measures of harm or profitability to punish those other transactions
directly, the defendant, likewise, will be subject to the risk of duplicative
punishment for those other transactions in subsequent actions brought by
the absent parties who were injured in those other transactions. Thus,
the reasoning of Campbell would seem to preclude use of evidence of
other transactions as a measure of profitability of the defendant’s
misconduct or as a measure of harm in relation to punitive damages.
Indeed, while Campbell does not expressly prohibit the use of harm or
potential harm to others in evaluating the relationship between actual
harm and punitive damages, the Court has defined harm in terms of
harm to the individual plaintiff.88 Thus, after Gore and Campbell, it is
likely that states must limit consideration of harm to that suffered by the
individuals before the court.89
Moreover, while the Court has not placed restrictions on the use of
evidence of other transactions to measure profitability expressly, the
Court has expressed concerns about the use of net wealth as an award

87. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
88. At least one lower court has expressly prohibited courts and juries from
considering harm to others as a measure of actual harm. See Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., 72
F.3d 648, 659–60 (8th Cir. 1995).
89. The actual harm caused by the defendant’s conduct toward the plaintiff might
more accurately describe the appropriate measure of actual harm. Such a measure would
take account of unrecoverable externalities resulting from the defendant’s misconduct.
As such, this measure would be more consistent with the original purpose of punitive
damages. It would also be consistent with the Court’s view of the role of punitive
damages. In Campbell, the Court notes that State Farm’s conduct towards the Campbells
deserves a more modest sanction, in part, because all of the Campbells’ harm has been
recouped through compensatory damages, and thus, punitive damages would be
duplicative. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003).
This suggests that the Court views the role of punitive damages, in part, as a measure to
compensate victims for otherwise unrecoverable harms.
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enhancer.90 Further, at least one lower court has interpreted Campbell to
prohibit use of evidence of other transactions as a measure of profitability
and to limit the decisionmaker’s ability to disgorge profits from the other
transactions. In Romo v. Ford Motor Co.,91 a California appellate court
concluded that Campbell constitutionalized a “narrow view” of the goal
and measure of punitive damages which limited a state’s legitimate
interest in imposing punitive damages to punishing only that conduct
which injured the plaintiff before the court and prohibited a state from
punishing a defendant for “everything else it may have done wrong.”92
As such, the Romo court concluded, in part, that a jury instruction
directing the jury to consider “the amount of punitive damages which
will have a deterrent effect on the defendant in light of defendant’s
financial condition” and argument of counsel that the jury should award
punitive damages based on the profit the defendant made on the sale of
all the same model defective product impermissibly “fail[ed] to restrict
the jury to punishment and deterrence based solely on the harm to the
plaintiffs.”93
V. CONCLUSION
I view this reformation of reprehensibility and potentially other
aspects of the procedures for awarding punitive damages favorably for
two reasons. While I am not certain that this reformation of reprehensibility
is the best solution to total harm damages, it is a solution which may
eliminate the practice of awarding total harm punitive damages in mass
tort litigation. This, in turn, may ensure the continued viability of
punitive damage claims in mass tort litigation.94 First, it may ensure the
viability of punitive damage claims by reducing the theoretical appeal of
90. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996) (“The fact that
BMW is a large corporation rather than an impecunious individual does not diminish its
entitlement to fair notice of the demands that the several States impose on the conduct of
its business.”); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 427 (“The wealth of a defendant cannot justify an
otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award.”).
91. Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 801–02 (Ct. App. 2003).
92. Id. at 802.
93. Id. at 805.
94. As other commentators have recognized, awarding punitive damages to
multiple injured parties furthers interests in retribution and compensation underlying
punitive damages. See, e.g., Owen, supra note 6; see also Anthony J. Sebok, What Did
Punitive Damages Do? Why Misunderstanding the History of Punitive Damages Matters
Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163, 181 (2003) (arguing that punitive damages, in part,
compensate the injured plaintiff for her hurt feelings).
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defendants’ claims of duplicative punishment. Second, on a practical
level, this reformation may reduce the size of punitive damage awards to
current claimants, and thereby increase the pool of assets available to
future claimants.95 Limiting the consideration of other act evidence to
consideration as a measure of the defendant’s knowledge only should
reduce the scope of other act evidence presented to punitive damage
decisionmakers. As a practical matter, this could reduce the number of
related transactions presented to decisionmakers. For example, while
evidence of transactions occurring prior to the transaction may be
relevant to a defendant’s knowledge, as Wohlwend demonstrates, conduct
subsequent to the transaction with the plaintiff would not bear on the
defendant’s knowledge at the time of the transaction with the plaintiff.96
Further, only prior transactions in which the defendant became aware of
harm to the injured party would be relevant to demonstrate knowledge.
To the extent that punitive damage decisionmakers do impose punitive
damages to sanction these other acts directly, reducing the number of
other acts that the decisionmakers consider should reduce the size of
punitive awards.
I also find the Court’s reformation of reprehensibility appealing because
it brings the process for awarding punitive damages more in line with the
retributivist principles which justify consideration of reprehensibility as
a measure for assessing punitive damages in the first instance. In
explaining the relevance of reprehensibility, the Gore Court relied on
what it perceived to be the well accepted retributivist principle of
reciprocity. The Court observed:
As the Court stated nearly 150 years ago, exemplary damages imposed on a
defendant should reflect “the enormity of his offense.” This principle reflects
95. Admittedly, on this front some empirical research suggests that Gore may not
have been successful. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The
Predictability of Punitive Damages Awards in Published Opinions, the Impact of BMW
v. Gore on Punitive Damages Awards, and Forecasting Which Punitive Awards Will Be
Reduced, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 59 (1999). Eisenberg and Wells report an increase in
mean punitive damage awards after Gore. However, they also report an increase in
compensatory awards and a statistically significant decrease in the ratio between punitive
and compensatory damages. Id. at 76. Whether Gore has had any sizeable effect on
punitive damages since 1999 remains to be measured. To this end, Eisenberg and Wells
noted that at the time that they conducted their research insufficient time might have
elapsed for Gore to have exercised significant influence on the pattern of punitive
awards. Id. at 61. Moreover, the effects of Campbell, of course, cannot be known at this
time.
96. See, e.g., Wohlwend v. Edwards, 796 N.E.2d 781, 787–88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003);
see also Jimenez v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 269 F.3d 439, 451 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating
that post-design evidence does not evince defendant’s contemporaneous consciousness
of wrongdoing); Fullmer v. Tague, 500 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Iowa 1993) (discussing that
evidence of similar conduct postdating the conduct giving rise to the litigation was not
relevant to show a pattern of wrongful conduct).
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the accepted view that some wrongs are more blameworthy than others. . . . In
TXO, both the West Virginia Supreme Court and the Justices of this Court
placed special emphasis on the principle that punitive damages may not be
“grossly out of proportion to the severity of the offense.”97

Reciprocity is integral to a retributivist model of criminal punishment.
Stated simply, reciprocity provides that the punishment should fit the
crime. Retributivist theorists and limited retributivist theorists have explained
that reciprocity demands that the punishment be measured by the
seriousness of the crime and that the seriousness be measured from a
social point of view, not solely from the perspective of what would be
required to make the injured party whole.98 In measuring the seriousness
of the crime from a social perspective, retributivist theorists measure not
only the harm to the victim, but also the seriousness of the right invasion
involved.99 Finally, retributivist theorists take into account the culpability
of the offender based on his or her state of mind.100
Reprehensibility as reformed by the Court better comports with this
model. The Court demands that punitive damages bear a reasonable
relationship to the harm caused by the defendant’s misconduct. Thus, the
Court takes into account the harm to the victim in measuring a reciprocal
sanction. The reprehensibility analysis then performs the dual function
of measuring the seriousness of the right invasion and accounting for the
defendant’s culpability. The seriousness of the right invasion stems not
from the fact that the defendant has engaged in similar invasions of
rights but rather from the nature of the right itself. This comports with
the retributivist ideal that punishment be for the bad act rather than for
the defendant’s status as a bad actor. Thus, in both Campbell and Gore,
the Court emphasizes aggravating factors like the use of trickery or
deceit or the vulnerability of the victim and ranks misconduct resulting
in physical harm as more serious than invasions of economic interests.101
97. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575–76 (1996) (citations
omitted).
98. Lawrence Crocker, The Upper Limit of Just Punishment, 41 EMORY L.J. 1059,
1081–83, 1088–92 (1992).
99. Id. at 1081–83, 1094–95.
100. Id. at 1088–92.
101. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003);
Gore, 517 U.S. at 576–77; see also Jane Mallor & Barry S. Roberts, Punitive Damages:
On the Path to a Principled Approach?, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1001, 1009 (1999) (“The
[Gore] Court provided a brief taxonomy of reprehensibility and indicated that the
amount of a punitive award should be in proportion to both the wrongfulness of the
defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s interest that the conduct implicated.”).
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Additionally, the Court emphasized the mental state of the defendant,
demanding full reciprocity when the defendant knowingly engaged in
misconduct but allowing lesser sanctions when the defendant was
merely reckless.102

102.
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Gore, 517 U.S. at 576.

